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A fraction of dynamic loci (178 loci, table S2)
show species-specific differences, whereat the
conserved gene pair was interrupted in the three
strains of one species by genes absent from the
three strains of the other species. These loci
would include sites whereat differences arose
while the Escherichia and Salmonella lineages
were diverging. Other dynamic loci (e.g., those
where only a single strain shows a difference)
would have arisen only after recombination had
effectively ceased between the two lineages.
Genes adjacent to species-specific loci are 6.2%
older than genes adjacent to other dynamic loci
(P < 10−2 by randomization; gray bars in Fig. 3);
thus, species-specific genes are not randomly
distributed but are found preferentially in the
older regions, indicating that the incipient
Escherichia and Salmonella lineages continued
to participate in recombination at loci unlinked
to lineage-specific genes.
In contrast to the rapid formation of eukary-
otic species boundaries, the ~70-My time frame
over which genetic isolation evolved between
Escherichia and Salmonella represents a tempo-
ral fragmentation of speciation. Because separate
lineages arise within populations that continue
to recombine at some loci for tens of millions
of years, relationships among species inferred
from few loci may underestimate their underly-
ing complexity. Taxa may show different relation-
ships depending on the genes compared. Long
periods of partial genetic isolation allow extant,
named species (such as E. coli) to contain mul-
tiple nascent species. Although one can observe
recombination at some genes within E. coli as a
whole, strains also have niche-specific loci that
may act as genetic progenitors for the creation
of new species. That is, it may not possible to
make a clear distinction between intraspecific
and interspecific variability (26), and clearly
defined species cannot represent newly formed
lineages. Therefore, the species concept proposed
by Dykhuizen and Green [in which gene phy-
logenies are congruent among representatives
of different species but are incongruent among
members of the same species (5)] works to
delineate long-established species but fails to
recognize incipient species.
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Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily
Self-Consciousness
Bigna Lenggenhager,1 Tej Tadi,1 Thomas Metzinger,2,3 Olaf Blanke1,4*
Humans normally experience the conscious self as localized within their bodily borders. This spatial
unity may break down in certain neurological conditions such as out-of-body experiences, leading
to a striking disturbance of bodily self-consciousness. On the basis of these clinical data, we
designed an experiment that uses conflicting visual-somatosensory input in virtual reality to disrupt
the spatial unity between the self and the body. We found that during multisensory conflict,
participants felt as if a virtual body seen in front of them was their own body and mislocalized
themselves toward the virtual body, to a position outside their bodily borders. Our results indicate
that spatial unity and bodily self-consciousness can be studied experimentally and are based on
multisensory and cognitive processing of bodily information.
Ever since William James categorized dif-ferent aspects of self-consciousness at theend of the 19th century, these aspects
have been continuously refined and expanded,
including many different sensory, emotional,
or cognitive layers. This has led to an excess
of definitions, in the absence of a widely ac-
cepted model of self-consciousness that is
based on empirical neurobiological data (1).
More recent philosophical and neurological
theories converge on the relevance of bodily
self-consciousness (i.e., the nonconceptual and
prereflective processing and representation of
body-related information) as one promising ap-
proach for the development of a comprehensive
neurobiological model of self-consciousness
(1–4).
We investigated bodily self-consciousness
experimentally, and we now describe an illusion
during which healthy participants experienced a
virtual body as if it were their own and localized
their “selves” outside of their body borders at a
different position in space. We modified the so-
called “rubber-hand illusion” (RHI), during
which synchronous stroking of a seen fake hand
and one’s own unseen hand causes the fake
hand to be attributed to one’s body (to “feel like
it is my hand”; misattribution). Under such con-
ditions of multisensory conflict, vision typically
dominates over proprioception and touch (5).
Several studies have demonstrated that the RHI
also induces a mislocalization of one’s hand
toward the fake hand, which is often referred to
as “proprioceptive drift” (6–8). Brain-imaging
studies associated the RHI mainly with the
activation of the multisensory premotor cortex,
posterior parietal areas (7), and right posterior
insula (9); these areas have also been implicated
in the integration of visual and somatosensory
signals in nonhuman primates (10). These ex-
perimental findings corroborate anecdotal clin-
ical data in neurological patients with right
temporo-parietal damage leading to somatopara-
phrenia, during which patients misattribute
their own hand or foot as belonging to another
person (11). The data on the RHI shows that
important subglobal aspects of bodily experi-
ence, such as self-attribution and self-localization
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of body parts, can be manipulated experimen-
tally (12).
Yet, the fundamental sense of selfhood
(2, 13, 14) that is associated with bodily self-
consciousness (but not with cognitive or
emotional layers of self-consciousness) is
experienced as the transparent content of a
single, coherent whole-body representation,
rather than as multiple representations of sepa-
rate body parts. Accordingly, the latter have
been referred to as the sense of body-part
ownership, whereas whole-body representations
or global ownership are directly associated with
the sense of selfhood (2). Studies on the RHI
and somatoparaphrenia thus investigated only
body-part ownership or the attribution and
localization of a body part with respect to the
global bodily self; i.e., a part-to-whole relation-
ship. Thus, these studies did not experimentally
manipulate selfhood per se.
To manipulate attribution and localization of
the entire body and to study selfhood, we de-
signed an experiment based on clinical data in
neurological patients with out-of-body experi-
ences. These data suggest that the spatial unity
between self and bodymay be disrupted (15–17),
leading in some cases to the striking experience
that the global self is localized at an extra-
corporeal position (15, 17). The aim of the
present experiments was to induce out-of-body
experiences in healthy participants to investigate
selfhood. We hypothesized that, under adequate
experimental conditions, participants would ex-
perience a visually presented body as if it were
their own, inducing a drift of the subjectively
experienced bodily self to a position outside
one’s bodily borders. Evidence for this conjecture
stems not just from out-of-body experiences, but
also from early anecdotal mirror-induced whole-
body illusions (18) and the phenomenon of
“presence” in virtual-reality environments (19, 20).
We applied virtual reality to examine the pos-
sible induction of out-of-body experiences by
using multisensory conflict. In the first experi-
ment, participants viewed the backs of their bodies
filmed from a distance of 2 m and projected onto
a three-dimensional (3D)–video head-mounted
display (HMD) (Fig. 1A). The participants’
backs were stroked for 1 min, either synchro-
nously or asynchronously with respect to the
virtually seen body. Global self-attribution of the
virtual character was measured by a question-
naire that was adapted from the RHI (6). Global
self-localization was measured by passively
displacing the blind-folded participants immedi-
ately after the stroking and asking them to return
to their initial position (21).
As predicted, participants showed a drift
toward the virtual body (anterior-posterior axis)
in the synchronous condition [24.1 ± 9.0 cm
(mean ± SEM)]. This position differed signifi-
cantly from the initial position (P = 0.02,
Student’s t test = 2.67) (21). In the asynchronous
condition, the drift was smaller (12. ± 8.5 cm)
and no longer significant (P = 0.17, t = 1.45)
(Fig. 2A). No significant drift was measured
along the left-to-right axis (fig. S1). Global
illusory self-localization was corroborated by
high–self-attribution scores on the three relevant
questionnaire items (Q1 to Q3) (21) also show-
ing significant differences between synchronous
and asynchronous conditions (all P values <
0.001) (Fig. 2B). Participants reported varied
feelings of “weirdness” or “strangeness,” and
some found the experiment irritating. None of the
participants reported sensations of overt disem-
bodiment or a change in visuospatial perspective.
In a second study, we examined whether this
illusion depends on cognitive knowledge about
bodies and whether the drift toward the virtual
body was not due to a general motor bias to
overshoot the target position. With the use of a
constant time delay in asynchronous conditions,
we either presented the participant’s own body
(as in study I) (Fig. 1A), a fake body (Fig. 1B),
or an object (Fig. 1C) being stroked synchro-
nously or not. Compared to a motor-control
condition [no visual scene was shown (21)], we
found a significant drift toward the virtual own
body (P = 0.02, t = 2.78) and the fake body (P =
0.01, t = 3.02) (21). This drift was weaker and
no longer significant in the case with a non-
corporeal object (P = 0.07, t = 1.95) and absent
when the stroking was asynchronous (all P
values > 0.11) (Fig. 3). There was no drift in
further control conditions or for the left-to-right
axis (21). Yet, self-attribution differed between
Fig. 1. (A) Participant (dark blue trousers) sees through a HMD his own virtual body (light blue trousers)
in 3D, standing 2 m in front of him and being stroked synchronously or asynchronously at the
participant's back. In other conditions (study II), the participant sees either (B) a virtual fake body (light
red trousers) or (C) a virtual noncorporeal object (light gray) being stroked synchronously or
asynchronously at the back. Dark colors indicate the actual location of the physical body or object,
whereas light colors represent the virtual body or object seen on the HMD. [Illustration by M. Boyer]
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the bodily conditions and the object condition.
The first two questions of the questionnaire (Q1
and Q2) were answered positively in all of the
synchronous conditions (own body, fake body,
and object) and were significantly different and
answered negatively in the asynchronous con-
ditions (P < 0.01, t > 2.56). However, the third
question (Q3: “It felt as if the virtual character
was my body”) led to different results. Whereas
in both bodily conditions (own body and fake
body) the result was the same as in Q1 and Q2
(P < 0.05, t > 2.40), this was not the case in the
object conditionwhere participants gave negative
scores in the synchronous condition, revealing no
significant difference between synchronous and
asynchronous stroking (P > 0.05, t = 1.55) (fig.
S2). This suggests that Q3 is important to
evaluate self-identification with virtual bodily
and nonbodily characters, whereas the first two
questions seem more related to the feeling and
location of touch.
With the use of virtual reality and multisen-
sory conflict, we induced an illusion that makes
it possible to quantify selfhood by manipulating
attribution and localization of the entire body.
Our results show that humans systematically
experience a virtual body as if it were their own
when visually presented in their anterior extra-
personal space and stroked synchronously. This
finding was corroborated by the participants’
mislocalization of their own bodies to a position
outside their bodies, showing that self-attribution
and localization of the entire body rely, at least
partly, on similar visual-somatosensory integra-
tive mechanisms to those of body parts (6–8).
Although research of visual-somatosensory inte-
gration has mostly investigated directly visible
body parts, comparable interactions have also
been found for body parts that humans cannot see
directly, such as the back (22). The overall pattern
of the data from studies I and II suggests that,
under appropriate conditions of multisensory
conflict between visual signals conveying infor-
mation about a virtual body (on a HMD) and
tactile, proprioceptive, and vestibular signals con-
veying information from the participant’s body,
visual capture is still present. There were also
differences between both studies. Asynchrony in
study IIwasmore predictable (21), and the relation
between felt and seen events might have been
perceived as stronger, leading to larger drifts in the
asynchronous conditions in study II. This might
have led to the diminished effect of synchrony on
the drift in the own-body condition, which is
compatible with higher questionnaire scores for
the asynchronous conditions from study II as
comparedwith those from study I (Q1 toQ3) (Fig.
2C and fig. S2A) (21).
By manipulating visual input in the RHI,
controversial data have been reported concern-
ing the influence of cognitive constraints on
multisensory integration, self-localization, and
self-attribution. Whereas some authors argue
that multisensory correlation is a sufficient con-
dition for self-attribution (23), others argue for
additional cognitive constraints in terms of
higher-level knowledge about the body (8). We
found evidence for higher-level knowledge by
revealing in study II a weaker drift toward the
object as compared with the fake-body condi-
tion, as well as a selective effect of synchrony in
the fake-body condition. Because the fake-body
and object conditions are completely compara-
ble concerning the experimental setup (21), and
given the pattern of results, we suggest that in
order to investigate the influence of cognitive
knowledge on self-localization, the comparison
between the fake-body and object conditions is
more relevant than that between the own-body
and object conditions. These effects on illusory
self-localization were corroborated by illusory
self-attribution. When asked whether it felt as if
the virtual character or object was their body
(Q3), participants self-identified with both bodily
stimuli but not with the object during synchronous
stroking. Collectively, these findings speak in
favor of bottom-up mechanisms as well as cog-
nitive constraint (8), rejecting a pure Bayesian ac-
count (23) for self-attribution and self-localization
of the entire body.
Illusory self-localization to a position outside
one’s body shows that bodily self-consciousness
and selfhood can be dissociated from one’s
physical body position. This finding differs from
the RHI, in which this aspect of selfhood
remained constant and only the attribution and
localization of the stimulated hand was manipu-
lated. Does illusory self-localization to a position
outside one’s bodymean that we have experimen-
tally induced full-blown out-of-body experiences?
Out-of-body experiences are characterized by a
disembodiment of the self to an extracorporeal
location, an extracorporeal visuospatial perspec-
tive, and the sight of one’s own body from this
self-location. Because the present illusion was
neither associated with overt disembodiment nor
with a change in visuospatial perspective, we
argue that we have induced only some aspects of
out-of-body experiences or rather the closely
related experience of heautoscopy that has also
been observed in neurological patients (15–17).
During heautoscopy, patients either constantly or
intermittently experience as if they were seeing
from and were localized at the position of an
illusory body, their physical body, or at an
intermediate position (15, 24). Such patients may
also see themselves from behind (17) and often
identify with the illusory body and partly transfer
selfhood to the illusory body, even if visual bodily
detail is lacking (17). Yet, they never report the
overt disembodiment that is themost characteristic
feature of out-of-body experiences (25, 26). Be-
cause our healthy participants did not report
feelings of overt disembodiment, the present data
suggest that other mechanisms in addition to
conflicting visual-somatosensory information,
such as visual-vestibular disintegration, are
involved in generating full-blown out-of-body
experiences and a more complete transfer of
selfhood to an illusory body. These findings are
compatible with clinical data (15, 17). Damage to
or electrical stimulation of the temporo-parietal
junction may lead to out-of-body experiences
and heautoscopy (15, 27), and healthy partic-
ipants activate the same region when employing
extracorporeal self-locations in mental imagery
(28, 29). Although other important aspects of
self-consciousness are likely to involve addition-
al brain areas such as the amygdala and the right
frontal cortex (3) as well as multisensory areas in
premotor and parietal cortices [representing both
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the seen and felt positions of one’s arm (10) and
correlating with the RHI (7)], we speculate that
humans’ daily experience of an embodied self
and selfhood, as well as the illusion reported
here, relies on brain mechanisms at the temporo-
parietal junction. Experimentally creating illu-
sions of the globalized, multisensory awareness
of selfhood in a controlled manner with virtual-
reality technology opens a new avenue for the
investigation of the neurobiological, functional,
and representational aspects of embodied self-
consciousness. Further research should include
the entire spectrum of disturbed global own-body
perceptions, ranging from autoscopic hallucina-
tions and heautoscopy to full-blown disembodied
states such as out-of-body experiences.
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